Financial Contracting:
Theory and Evidence |
||||
University of Mannheim, 20-21 April 2007 |
||||
A conference organized by the University of Mannheim,
the Journal of Financial Intermediation, the European Corporate
Governance Institute, the German National Science Foundation, and
the Center for Financial Studies
|
||||
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
|
Friday, 20 April 2007
|
|||
| 08:15 | Registration | ||
| 08:45 | Welcome | ||
| 09:00 | Session 1 (Lending) | ||
| S. Drucker (Columbia University) M. Puri (Duke University) |
Loan Sales, Loan Contracting, and Lending Relationships | ||
| G.
Nini (BoG, Federal Reserve) D. Smith (University of Virginia) A. Sufi (University of Chicago) |
Creditor Control Rights and Firm Investment Policy | ||
| Coffee Break | |||
I. Ben- David (University of Chicago) |
Fraud and Moral Hazard in Financial Contracts: Do Borrowers Cheat more when Lenders Care less? | ||
| 12:45 | Lunch | ||
| 14:15 | Session 2 (Venture Capital) | ||
| R.
Masulis (Vanderbilt University) R. Nahata (Baruch College) |
Strategic Investing and Financial Contracting in Start-ups: Evidence from Corporate Venture Capital | ||
| D. Skeie (Federal Reserve New York) | Vesting and Control in Venture Capital Contracts | ||
| Coffee Break | |||
| 16:40 | Session 3 | ||
| A. Gavazza (Yale University) | Asset Liquidity, Boundaries of the Firm and Financial Contracts: Evidence from Aircraft Leases | ||
| Break | |||
| 17:45 | Keynote
Address: Contracts versus Institutions: A Critique of Corporate-Governance Theory |
 |
|
| M. Hellwig (Max-Planck Institut, Bonn) | |||
| 18:30 | End of sessions | ||
| 20:00 | Dinner | ||
Saturday, 20 April 2007
|
|||
| 08:45 | Session 4 (Bankruptcy) | ||
| T.
Chang (MIT) A. Schoar (MIT) |
|||
| N. Gennaioli
(Stockholm School of Economics) S. Rossi (Stockholm School of Economics) |
Optimal Resolutions of Financial Distress by Contract | ||
| Coffee break | |||
| Session 5: | |||
| M. Hellwig (Max-Planck Institute Bonn) | A Reconsideration of the Jensen-Meckling Model of Outside Finance | ||
| 12:30 | Lunch | ||
| 14:00 | Session 6 (Compensation) | ||
| G.
Aragon (Arizona State University) J. Qian (Boston College) |
The Role of High Water Marks in Hedge Fund Compensation | ||
| N.
Baranchuk (University of Texas) G. MacDonald (Washington University) J. Yang (Indiana University) |
The Economics of Super Managers | ||
| Coffee Break | |||
| I.
Dittmann (University of Rotterdam) E. Maug (Universität Mannheim) O. Spalt (Universität Mannheim) |
Executive Stock Options when Managers Are Loss Averse | ||
| R.
Inderst (Universität Frankfurt) H. Müller (New York University) |
CEO Compensation and Private Information: An Optimal Contracting Perspective | ||
| 18:30 | End of sessions | ||
| 20:00 | Dinner | ||